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I. INTRODUCTION 
Even though the Indian Child Welfare Act of 19781 was passed 
thirty-one years ago, determining state versus tribal jurisdiction over 
the various components of Indian child welfare proceedings in a 
Public Law 2802 state remains a confusing area of the law.  This 
 
 † The author is a member of the Yurok Tribe.  He is presently employed by 
the Corporate Commission of the Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe Indians and 
previously worked as an associate at Best and Flanagan LLP. 
 1. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2006). 
 2. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–1326 
(2006).  Public Law 280 was a transfer of jurisdiction from the federal government to 
state governments.  Congress gave six states (five states initially—California, 
Minnesota (except the Red Lake Nation), Nebraska, Oregon (except the Warm 
Springs Reservation), and Wisconsin (except later the Menominee Reservation); and 
then Alaska upon statehood) extensive criminal and civil jurisdiction over tribal lands 
within the affected states.  Since then, Nevada, South Dakota, Washington, Florida, 
Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, Arizona, Iowa, and Utah have assumed some 
jurisdiction over crimes committed by tribal members on tribal lands.  Public Law 280 
also permitted the other states to acquire jurisdiction at their option. 
1
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jurisdictional determination goes to the heart of tribal sovereignty 
and a tribe’s ability to self-govern because nothing is more central to a 
tribal government than the protection of its tribal members, particu-
larly its children. 
Currently, this issue is central to the discussions between Tribes3 
in Wisconsin and the Wisconsin Department of Children and Families 
as part of the Alternative Funding Workgroup.  This workgroup is 
tasked with exploring funding mechanisms that honor the govern-
ment-to-government relationship between the State of Wisconsin and 
the eleven tribal sovereigns within the state’s borders and that 
recognize the vast array of services that tribal social service systems 
provide.  Unfortunately, the uncertainty surrounding Indian child 
welfare jurisdiction has frustrated the progress of the workgroup.  
Without establishing which sovereign has the jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate Indian child welfare issues, it is difficult to decipher which 
sovereign also has the responsibility to fund the services provided to 
the citizens who are the subjects of the Indian child welfare case at 
hand. 
This article will address the jurisdictional issues between Tribes in 
Wisconsin subject to Public Law 2804 and the State of Wisconsin itself 
along with an analysis of which sovereign is responsible for funding 
the services to the families. 
II. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE ICWA AND PUBLIC LAW 280. 
Generally, jurisdiction refers to “[a] government’s general power 
to exercise authority over all persons and things within its territory.”5  
Determining which governmental entity would exercise jurisdiction 
over Indian children was one of the core interests of Congress when it 
passed the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).6  Before the passage of 
 
 3. Bad River Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians; Lac Court Oreilles Band 
of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians; Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior 
Chippewa Indians; Red Cliff Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians; Sokaogan 
Mole Lake Community; St. Croix Chippewa Indians; Forest County Potawatomi; 
Stockbridge Munsee Community; Menominee Indian Tribe; Oneida Native American 
Tribes of Wisconsin; Ho-Chunk Nation. 
 4. The Menominee Indian Tribe is not subject to Public Law 280 due to 
termination and later restoration of the tribe.  Memorandum from Senior Staff 
Attorney Joyce L. Kiel to Members of the Special Comm. on State-Tribal Relations 2 
n.6 (Dec. 10, 2004), www.legis.state.wi.us/lc/committees/study/2004/STR/
files/memono3_str.pdf. 
 5. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 927 (9th ed. 2009). 
 6. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 36 (1989). 
2
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this Act, state courts had exercised jurisdiction and “failed to recog-
nize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the social and 
cultural standards in tribal communities, and thus harmed tribal 
interests.”7  The ICWA was designed to remedy these failures by 
creating presumptive jurisdiction in tribal courts.8 
The ICWA established a dual-jurisdiction paradigm.  “[T]ribes 
have exclusive jurisdiction over child custody matters when the Indian 
child resides or is domiciled on an Indian reservation, or when the 
child is a ward of the tribal court, unless another federal law provides 
otherwise . . . .”9  Tribes also have concurrent jurisdiction with the 
state over Indian children who reside or are domiciled off the 
reservation.10 
The ICWA’s reference in section 1911(a) to exclusive jurisdic-
tion, unless other federal law provides otherwise, presumably refers to 
Public Law 280,11 which was passed decades earlier.  Instead of 
clarifying the jurisdictional interrelation between the ICWA and 
Public Law 280,12 Congress, in passage of the ICWA, left that issue to 
be decided by the courts.   
To understand how the two federal acts interplay, it is prudent to 
briefly review the history of each act.  Generally, Public Law 28013 was 
passed to address the perceived lack of criminal law enforcement on 
tribal lands.  However, Public Law 280 also contained a civil jurisdic-
tion provision14 intended to allow for native people to have their civil 
issues heard in a state forum if a tribal forum did not exist.  Unfortu-
nately, the legislative language used by Congress to effectuate this 
intent was not clear.  
However, Supreme Court precedent has clarified the scope of 
this jurisdictional grant.  For example, in Bryan v. Itasca, the Court 
pronounced that Public Law 28015 was “primarily intended to redress 
 
 7. NATIVE AM. RIGHTS FUND, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE 
ACT 16 (2007) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (2006)). 
 8. Id. (citing Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 36 
(1989)).  
 9. Id.  See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (2006). 
 10. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (2006). 
 11. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–1326 
(2006).   
 12. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–1326 
(2006).   
 13. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–1326 
(2006).   
 14. 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006). 
 15. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–1326 
3
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the lack of adequate Indian forums for resolving private legal disputes 
between reservation Indians, and between Indians and other private 
citizens.”16 
The U.S. Supreme Court also addressed the scope of Public Law 
28017 in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.18  In Cabazon, the 
Court analyzed whether California’s gaming law was applicable within 
the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians’s reservation under Public Law 
280.19  To determine the scope of Public Law 280’s grant of state 
jurisdiction, the Court focused on whether the law to be enforced was 
criminal/prohibitory or civil/regulatory in nature.20 
[I]f the intent of a state law is generally to prohibit certain 
conduct, it falls within Pub. L. 280’s grant of criminal juris-
diction, but if the state law generally permits the conduct at 
issue, subject to regulation, it must be classified as civ-
il/regulatory and Pub. L. 280 does not authorize its en-
forcement on an Indian reservation.  The shorthand test is 
whether the conduct at issue violates the State’s public poli-
cy.21 
Applying this analysis, the Court held that the state’s gaming laws 
were civil/regulatory.22  California’s public policy did not forbid 
gambling since the State operated its own lottery, authorized pari-
mutuel betting on horses, and permitted many organizations to 
conduct bingo and card games.23  The mere fact that California’s 
regulations were enforced by misdemeanor penalties did not change 
their civil/regulatory nature to criminal/prohibitory.24 
This background on Public Law 280 frames the discussion of the 
interplay between Public Law 280 and the ICWA.  The crux of the 
analysis must begin with section 1911(a) of the ICWA, which ad-
 
(2006). 
 16. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 383–84 (1976).  (stating that Public Law 
280 did not give the states general regulatory powers over tribes and their members); 
see also Jake J. Allen, Chipping Away at the Indian Child Welfare Act: Doe v. Mann and the 
Court’s “1984” Interpretation of ICWA and P.L. 280 20–21 (Indigenous Law & Policy 
Ctr., Working Paper No. 2007–03, 2007), available at http://www.law.msu.edu/
indigenous/papers/2007-03.pdf. 
 17. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–1326 
(2006). 
 18. 480 U.S. 202 (1987). 
 19. Id. at 211–22. 
 20. Id. at 209–10. 
 21. Id. at 209. 
 22. Id. at 211–12. 
 23. Id. at 210. 
 24. Id. at 211.  
4
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dresses exclusive tribal jurisdiction except where such jurisdiction is 
otherwise vested in the state by existing federal law.25  This reference 
to existing federal law is somewhat amorphous but has been generally 
thought to reference Public Law 280.  Based on the Bryan v. Itasca and 
California v. Cabazon Supreme Court cases, the analysis as to whether 
Public Law 280 confers jurisdiction upon the State within the 
reservation is based upon whether the laws to be applied are civ-
il/regulatory or criminal/prohibitory.  This must be considered along 
with the intent of Public Law 280 to provide a forum to hear disputes 
between native people or between a native person and a non-native 
state citizen in a state forum, thus focusing on private litigation. 
Hence, based on Supreme Court precedent and Congress’s in-
tent in passing Public Law 280, it is sound to conclude that actions 
commenced by state agencies against parents to remove children or to 
bring the family relationship under court supervision fall within the 
civil/regulatory analysis of Supreme Court precedence.  Those actions 
also fall outside of the private party actions contemplated by Congress 
in passing Public Law 280.  Furthermore, the Attorney General of 
Wisconsin found that involuntary proceedings to terminate parental 
rights based on neglect or abuse are regulatory in nature and fall 
outside the boundary of the State’s Public Law 280 civil jurisdiction.26  
Therefore, in the State of Wisconsin, a reassumption of jurisdiction 
under the ICWA section 1918(a) is not required for the tribe to have 
exclusive jurisdiction within the reservation boundaries. 
This means that all phases of a child welfare investigation or pro-
ceeding fall within the jurisdiction of the tribe when the child is 
domiciled within the reservation.  The phases include, but are not 
limited to, Child Protective Services initial assessment investigations, 
removal of children from the home, and child in need of protection 
or services cases.27 
The case typically cited in opposition to this analysis is Doe v. 
Mann.28  However, this case has no binding authority in Wisconsin and 
fails to address the Wisconsin-specific analysis that is the subject of this 
article.  The Doe v. Mann opinion is flawed in pointing to In re Burgess29 
as somehow diminishing the effect of the 1981 Wisconsin Attorney 
 
 25. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (2006). 
 26. 70 Wis. Op. Att’y Gen. 237 (1981).  See also Allen, supra note 16, at 14. 
 27. See e.g., NATIONAL INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ASSOCIATION, INDIAN CHILD WELFARE 
GLOSSARY AND FLOWCHART 3, http://www.narf.org/icwa/resources/flowcharts/
glossary.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2009). 
 28. 415 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 29. 665 N.W.2d 124 (Wis. 2003). 
5
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General Opinion that specifically addresses child welfare jurisdiction 
under the Indian Child Welfare Act in the State of Wisconsin.  In re 
Burgess did not deal with child welfare jurisdiction, but instead was an 
insanity proceeding by the State against a sexually violent individual.30 
In re Burgess did, however, partly address Wisconsin’s Public Law 
280 jurisdiction.31  In addressing the Public Law 280 issues in In re 
Burgess, the Wisconsin Supreme Court relied heavily on the fact that 
Mr. Burgess challenged the jurisdiction of the state court to adjudi-
cate his issues as a tribal member domiciled on the reservation.32  The 
district court contacted the Lac du Flambeau Tribal Court to 
determine if the Tribal Court was able and willing to exercise 
jurisdiction over the matter.33  The Lac du Flambeau Tribal Court 
declined jurisdiction because the tribe had not yet passed an ordin-
ance to address the commitment of sexually violent persons such as 
Burgess.34  But for this declination of jurisdiction, it is quite probable 
that the case would have been transferred to Lac du Flambeau Tribal 
Court at that time.  This fact was a crucial threshold issue tipping the 
balance, in the supreme court’s opinion, towards determining that 
the state had jurisdiction over the matter. 
The supreme court stated,  
[f]urthermore, the tribal court in this case declined to ac-
cept jurisdiction because the Lac du Flambeau Tribe had 
not yet passed an ordinance regarding the commitment of 
sexually violent persons.  Thus, the appropriateness of state 
jurisdiction is bolstered since one of the stated purposes of 
Pub. L. 280 was to ‘redress the lack of adequate Indian fo-
rums.’35   
Therefore, if the Lac du Flambeau Tribe had passed an ordin-
ance and accepted jurisdiction over the matter when the district court 
inquired whether the tribal court was going to exercise jurisdiction, 
the case would have been transferred.  Had it been transferred, the 
supreme court’s decision would have likely tipped in the other 
direction, towards allowing a finding under a Public Law 280 analysis 
that the tribal court was the proper court to exercise jurisdiction over 
this matter. 
 
 30. Id. at 127. 
 31. Id. at 129–30. 
 32. Id. at 127. 
 33. Id. at 127–28. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 133. 
6
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This analysis of the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision In re Bur-
gess is bolstered by the opinions rendered upon appeal by the U.S. 
District Court of the Western District of Wisconsin36 and the 7th 
Circuit.37  The opinion from the federal district court notes the great 
weight given the tribal court’s declination of jurisdiction and further 
states that Burgess’s argument has merit.38  Unfortunately, the 
standard in this appeal was substantial, which resulted in the court’s 
holding that  
[i]n sum, even if the Wisconsin Supreme Court were incorrect 
to conclude that Chapter 980 falls within the scope of Pub. 
L. 280’s jurisdictional grant, this conclusion is not an unrea-
sonable application of clearly established federal law as de-
termined by the Supreme Court of the United States.  
Therefore, Burgess is not entitled to habeas relief on his first 
claim.39 
The 7th Circuit, likewise, treated the declination of jurisdiction 
by the tribal court as a threshold issue because it noted that as a result 
of that declination, the district court denied Burgess’s motion based 
on its understanding that the State was allowed to assert jurisdiction 
over reservation Indians in any area where the tribe did not have an 
ongoing tradition of acting.40  The 7th Circuit took issue with the 
analysis used by the Wisconsin Supreme Court to hold that the State 
of Wisconsin had jurisdiction over a tribal member residing on the 
reservation.  The 7th Circuit stated “[w]ith respect, we cannot agree 
with the Supreme Court of Wisconsin that Chapter 980 qualifies as a 
‘criminal statute.’”41 
Furthermore, the 7th Circuit stated, “[i]n the final analysis, if this 
case turned solely on the question whether clearly established federal 
law would permit a characterization of chapter 980 as criminal, we 
would need to reverse.”42  In the 7th Circuit’s analysis, they started 
with the premise in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Bryan v. Itasca 
County that the civil grant in Public Law 280 was primarily intended 
“to redress the lack of adequate Indian forums for resolving private 
legal disputes between reservation Indians, and between Indians and 
 
 36. Burgess v. Watters, No. 04-C-544-C, 2005 WL 106780 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 19, 
2005). 
 37. Burgess v. Watters, 467 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 38. Burgess, 2005 WL 106780, at *11. 
 39. Burgess, 2005 WL 106780, at *14.  
 40. Burgess, 467 F.3d at 679–80.  
 41. Id. at 684.  
 42. Id. at 676, 686. 
7
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other private citizens,” not to “confer general state civil regulatory 
authority over reservation Indians.”43  The appellate court also stated, 
“[t]his court has questioned whether a state would have jurisdiction 
involuntarily to commit an enrolled tribal member, but we did not 
need to decide this issue.”44  
There are certainly strong arguments that Chapter 980 falls out-
side Public Law 280’s limited grant of civil jurisdiction.  In other 
contexts, the Supreme Court has expressly classified these types of 
civil laws that aim to protect the public from danger as “regulatory.”45  
The 7th Circuit also noted that at least one court has determined that 
a state lacks the authority to involuntarily commit a mentally ill tribal 
member who resides on a reservation.46  The 7th Circuit also cited the 
1981 Wisconsin Attorney General opinion47 as bolstering its opinion 
that exercising the jurisdiction is not within Public Law 280’s grant of 
jurisdiction over Indian Country in the State of Wisconsin.48  The 
court did note that Doe v. Mann49 has taken a different approach to 
interpreting Public Law 280’s limited grant of civil authority and 
therefore “[t]his is enough to show, under the generous AEDPA50 
standards, that the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s conclusion does not 
lie outside the bounds of permissible differences of opinion.  We thus 
cannot conclude that the court unreasonably applied clearly estab-
lished federal law.”51 
Given the Seventh Circuit’s sharp criticism of the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court’s rationale for concluding that the State could exercise 
 
 43. Id. at 686 (citing Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 384 (1976)).  
 44. Id.  See also United States v. Teller, 762 F.2d 569, 577 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting 
that “questions of jurisdiction are raised by two facts—the crime took place on an 
Indian reservation, and so trial was to be in federal court, and the defendant is an 
Indian, and so perhaps not subject to the state’s civil commitment procedures”). 
 45. Burgess, 467 F.3d at 686–87.  See also Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105 (2003); 
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361–62 (1983).  The Supreme Court has also 
held that a state has authority under its police power to protect the community from 
dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill.  See generally Addington v. Texas, 
441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979). 
 46. White v. Califano, 437 F. Supp. 543, 549 (D.S.D. 1977), aff’d., 581 F.2d 697 
(8th Cir. 1978) (determining that because “the process of committing someone 
involuntarily brings the power of the state deep into the lives of the persons involved 
in the commitment process. . . . [A]pplying the procedures of an involuntary 
commitment to an Indian person in Indian country would require severe intrusions 
into the tribe’s vestigial sovereignty”). 
 47. 70 Wis. Op. Att’y. Gen. 237 (1981). 
 48. Burgess, 467 F.3d at 687. 
 49. 415 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 50. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006). 
 51. Burgess, 467 F.3d at 687. 
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Public Law 280 jurisdiction to civilly commit a tribal member 
domiciled on the reservation, it is likely that absent the generous 
standard of review applicable to the case, the 7th Circuit would have 
overruled the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 
All but one tribe in the State of Wisconsin have tribal courts 
which regularly exercise jurisdiction over child welfare matters and, 
therefore, even under the Wisconsin Supreme Court analysis, the 
issue should be properly heard in a tribal court.   
For any criminal abuse or neglect charges that may come to light 
from a child protective services investigation, the criminal jurisdiction 
is concurrent within the reservation under Public Law 280.  There-
fore, the tribe could prosecute such offenses but is limited by the 
Indian Civil Rights Act as to the penalties that can be assessed.  The 
Indian Civil Rights Act limits a tribe to imposing a maximum of one 
year of imprisonment and a fine of $5000, or both.52  The state could 
also prosecute that same individual for the same criminal charges 
under its jurisdictional authority and there would not be a double 
jeopardy argument available to the defendant.53  Off the reservation, 
the state would have criminal jurisdiction to proceed against the tribal 
member. 
III. THE IMPACT OF WISCONSIN’S CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES LAW 
Wisconsin law requires the state agency to investigate any reports 
received about child abuse or neglect.54  This requirement attaches to 
all abuse or neglect reports within the state’s jurisdiction.55  The state 
was not granted jurisdiction over child welfare or child protective 
services (CPS) issues within reservations located in the State of 
Wisconsin.56  The ICWA does allow for emergency removal or 
placement of a child, but only when the emergency removal is of an 
Indian child who is a resident of or is domiciled on a reservation but 
temporarily located off the reservation.57 
If a tribe is not able to provide twenty-four hour CPS to tribal 
members, the tribe could enter an intergovernmental agreement with 
 
 52. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (2006).  
 53. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 330 (1978) (noting that it does not 
violate the Fifth Amendment provision against double jeopardy for the Tribe and the 
federal government to prosecute a defendant for the same offense; both independent 
sovereigns are entitled to vindicate their identical public policies). 
 54. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(3)(c)1.a (West Supp. 2009). 
 55. Id. 
 56. See supra Part I. 
 57. 25 U.S.C. § 1922 (2006) (emphasis added). 
9
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the county agencies surrounding the reservation for any coverage the 
tribe could not provide as part of the tribe’s inherent sovereign 
powers.58 
IV. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS AND REMOVAL AUTHORITY 
It has been reported that the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) 
has taken the position with Tribal Child Welfare programs that BIA 
funds cannot be used for CPS investigations and the removal of 
children from homes.59  This assertion by the BIA is not founded in 
the language of the ICWA nor in any regulations or the BIA Guide-
lines for state courts.60  The jurisdictional discussion in Part I, above, 
indicates that the tribes have full authority to conduct CPS investiga-
tions and remove children when warranted.61 
The BIA may be taking the position that they are a payor of last 
resort and, because Wisconsin Statutes mandate county social services 
to do CPS investigations, that the State should have the responsibility 
for funding such investigations.  This argument is flawed, however, 
because the State was not granted any jurisdiction to conduct CPS 
investigations within the reservation.62 
V. REASSUMPTION OF EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION UNDER THE ICWA 
According to the Wisconsin Attorney General, a reassumption of 
exclusive jurisdiction under the ICWA affects proceedings that do not 
fall within the civil regulatory jurisdiction granted to the State under 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Public Law 280.63  Examples of 
non-regulatory proceedings that may fall under the jurisdictional 
grant of Public Law 280 are proceedings such as a voluntary termina-
tion of parental rights and voluntary adoption proceedings.64  Without 
a reassumption of exclusive jurisdiction, these actions may be subject 
to concurrent jurisdiction.  The reassumption would eliminate the 
 
 58. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(3)(c)(9)(cm) (West Supp. 2009). 
 59. See e.g., Administration for Children and Families, Considerations for Indian 
Tribes, Indian Tribal Organizations or Tribal Consortia Seeking to Operate a Tribal 
Title IV-E Program, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/laws_policies/
tribal_considerations.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2009). 
 60. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2006). See also Bureau of Indian Affairs Guidelines for 
State Courts: Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 FED. REG. 67584 (Nov. 26, 1979), 
available at http://www.nicwa.org/policy/regulations/icwa/ICWA_guidelines.pdf. 
 61. See supra Part I. 
 62. See supra Part III. 
 63. 70 Wis. Op. Att’y Gen. 237, 3 (1981). 
 64. Id. at 4. 
10
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State’s concurrent jurisdiction over these actions within the reserva-
tion, or over the area granted exclusive jurisdiction under the petition 
as accepted by the federal government.65 
VI. VOLUNTARY ACTIONS AND STATE COURT JURISDICTION 
Tribes have exclusive jurisdiction in the State of Wisconsin over 
involuntary child welfare proceedings within the reservation when the 
child is residing on or domiciled within the reservation.66  If the tribe 
has reassumed exclusive jurisdiction under the ICWA, the tribe also 
has jurisdiction over voluntary child welfare proceedings.67  This 
exclusive jurisdiction does not allow a state court to hear these matters 
absent an intergovernmental agreement allowing the State to exercise 
such jurisdiction in accordance with any limitations drafted in the 
agreement. 
VII. CHILD WELFARE SERVICES AND FUNDING 
Jurisdiction and financial responsibility are two separate con-
cepts.  “Jurisdiction refers to the authority of a government to 
adjudicate or decide a particular legal matter in its court, while service 
responsibility refers to the particular government which is responsible 
for providing services to the children and families involved in a 
particular child welfare proceeding.”68  Tribal members are tri-citizens 
because they are citizens of their tribe, the United States, and the state 
in which they reside.69  This status entitles them to state services 
which, as state citizens, they are eligible to receive, even if the tribe 
exercises jurisdiction in a particular case.70  In child welfare situations, 
many of the services provided to children and families by the State will 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 7; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (2006) (“An Indian tribe shall have 
jurisdiction exclusive as to any State over any child custody proceeding . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). 
 67. 70 Wis. Op. Att’y Gen. 237 (1981). 
 68. NATIVE AM. RIGHTS FUND, supra note 7, at 18. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id.  See also Howe v. Ellenbecker, 8 F. 3d 1258, 1263 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding 
that Title IV-D of the Social Security Act created a Section 1983 cause of action to 
obtain child support from absent parents living on Indian reservations), limited by 
Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997) (limiting standing under Section 1983); 
Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of the Domestic 
Dependent Nation, 83 OR. L. REV. 1109, 1145 (2004) (citing a string of cases in which 
tribal members have been found to have rights to equal state services notwithstanding 
their tribal membership). 
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be partially federally funded.  The federal funding prohibits States 
from discriminating upon the basis of race or political subdivision 
within the state.71 
The U.S. Constitution guarantees the equal protection of the laws 
to all of its citizens through the Fourteenth Amendment.72  Tribal 
members who were not already granted citizenship were made citizens 
of the United States by the 1924 Snyder Act.73  State citizenship was 
officially recognized only in the 1970s, by a combination of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the Snyder Act.74  Therefore tribal 
members are citizens of all three sovereigns: the United States, the 
individual state in which they are domiciled, and the tribe of which 
they are a member.75   
This tri-citizenship means that enrolled members of an Indian 
tribe are guaranteed the equal protection of the laws.76  Therefore, if a 
State pays for the placement of other state children as ordered by a 
court of competent jurisdiction, it must also do so for tribal children 
who happen to also be citizens of another sovereign. 
While the Equal Protection Clause guarantees against infringe-
ment of civil liberties by the States, States have not historically 
afforded tribal members equal protection when provision of state 
services are at issue.  States often argue that because trust land is not 
subject to state property taxes, tribal members should not benefit 
from the services paid through property taxation.77  Another popular 
argument is that the welfare of Indian people is the sole responsibility 
 
 71. See Native American Rights Fund, A Practical Guide to the Indian Child 
Welfare Act, FAQ 2: Jurisdiction, http://www.narf.org/icwa/faq/jurisdiction.htm#qa 
(last visited Jan. 2, 2010) (noting that most federal funding sources, such as the Social 
Security Act’s Title IV-E Foster Care and Adoption Assistance, have requirements tied 
to the receipt of these funds). 
 72. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 73. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2006). 
 74. Goodluck v. Apache County, 417 F. Supp. 13, 16 (D. Ariz. 1976), aff’d sub 
nom. Apache County v. United States, 492 U.S. 876 (1976). 
 75. Citizenship requirements for the tribal sovereign are heavily influenced by 
the Tribe’s constitution.  See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 
§ 4.01(2)(a)–(c) (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2005) (1940). 
 76. See Krakoff, supra note 70, at 1145.  Equal protection under tribal law is itself 
guaranteed by the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (2006). 
 77. See Acosta v. County of San Diego, 126 Cal. App. 2d 455, 459 (1954); see also 
Carole Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Is Public Law 280 Fit for the Twenty-First 
Century? Some Data At Last, 38 CONN. L. REV. 697, 704 (2006) (“Because reservation 
trust lands are exempt from state and local property taxes, and tribal members living 
and earning income on reservations are exempt from state taxes, some of the most 
important sources of funding for local law enforcement and criminal justice on 
reservations were unavailable.”). 
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of the federal government.78  Both of these arguments have failed in 
the courts under an equal protection analysis because States do not 
base services to their non-Indian citizens on proof of taxpaying status, 
and the federal government has not fulfilled its trust responsibility in 
a manner that takes care of all tribal member needs.79  As an example, 
the courts have held that services must be rendered to Indians just as 
they are to non-Indians in the following categories: admission into 
public schools;80 general relief services;81 and indigent health servic-
es.82  The courts have upheld the right of Indians to access these social 
services in the same manner as other citizens of the state.  This same 
analysis would apply to social services rendered to other state citizens 
in the child welfare arena. 
Therefore, even though the tribes may exercise child welfare 
jurisdiction in various cases, this does not alleviate the counties or the 
State from their duty to provide services to those Wisconsin citizens 
who also happen to be citizens of a tribal sovereign. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Due in part to the federal government’s policy of supporting tri-
bal self-governance, tribal governmental structure has flourished in 
the last couple of decades.  One area of dramatic growth and 
development has been in the area of child welfare.  Every tribe in the 
State of Wisconsin has a child welfare department and all but one 
tribe have a court with child welfare subject matter jurisdiction.83  
Because the tribes have this well-developed infrastructure, the State of 
Wisconsin is required to defer to tribal jurisdiction.  This is not only a 
legal requirement but it is good policy; no other governmental unit is 
better equipped to resolve the interplay of tribal culture, custom, and 
tradition with the child welfare laws to the benefit of the whole family 
structure, which includes the family’s connection to the tribe. 
 
 78. See Acosta, 126 Cal. App. 2d at 462. 
 79. Id. at 462, 466 (holding that “the jurisdiction of the United States over the 
Indians residing on Indian reservations . . . is not exclusive” and that tax-exempt 
status does not “serve[] as a justification for [the denial of] equal treatment under 
state welfare laws”). 
 80. See Piper v. Big Pine Sch. Dist., 193 Cal. 664, 674 (1924). 
 81. See Acosta, 126 Cal. App. 2d at 466. 
 82. See County of Blaine v. Moore, 568 P.2d 1216, 1222 (Mont. 1977).  
 83. Currently the Oneida Nation of Wisconsin does not have a court that 
exercises child welfare jurisdiction.  See Oneida Tribal Judicial System Home Page, 
http://www.oneidanation.org/government/page.aspx?id=4780 (last visited Nov. 27, 
2009) (listing types of cases the court reviews). 
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The more difficult pill to swallow is that deferring to tribal juris-
diction does not absolve the State of funding responsibilities to the 
tribal families as “tri-citizens.”  This concept is difficult for most legal 
minds to grasp because of the unique situation that is presented for 
analysis when tribal members are involved.  Typically, when another 
sovereign asserts jurisdiction, it also takes on funding responsibility, 
usually because of a change in domicile for the parties involved.  In 
the case of Indian families, the citizenship status of the family 
members as to the State of Wisconsin does not change simply because 
the tribal court asserts jurisdiction over the family for the purposes of 
adjudicating the child welfare matter at hand. 
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